Montana Law Review Online
Volume 77

Article 13

4-15-2016

State v. Colburn: Montana’s Rape Shield Law and the Rights of an
Accused Under the Montana Constitution
Brandon Shannon
Alexander Blewett III School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr_online

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Brandon Shannon, Case Note, State v. Colburn: Montana’s Rape Shield Law and the Rights of an Accused
Under the Montana Constitution, 77 Mont. L. Rev. Online 97, https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr_online/
vol77/iss1/13.

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Montana Law Review Online by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at University of
Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

2016

CASENOTE: STATE V. COLBURN

97

CASENOTE; State v. Colburn: Montana’s rape shield law and the
rights of an accused under the Montana Constitution
Brandon Shannon
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Colburn,1 the Montana Supreme Court applied a
balancing test to determine if evidence of prior abuse of a victim, to prove
fabrication and an alternate source of knowledge, was improperly
excluded under Montana’s rape shield law.2 Because Colburn’s right to
confrontation is fundamental under the Montana Constitution, however,
the correct test is strict scrutiny. Further, the exclusion of the evidence was
proper because it meets strict scrutiny.
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE
A jury found James Morris Colburn guilty of both sexual
intercourse without consent and sexual assault of his eleven-year-old
neighbor, R.W.3 The jury also found Colburn guilty of incest of his elevenyear-old daughter, C.C.4
At trial, the State called R.W., who testified in detail that Colburn
molested her. The State also called C.C., who described inappropriate
touching.5 To support this testimony, the state called Nurse Practitioner
Mary Hansen, who conducted forensic interviews of both girls.6 She stated
that both R.W. and C.C. gave statements consistent with children who had
been molested.7 Hansen stated that R.W. had sexual knowledge, indicating
R.W. had been abused.8 Hansen also testified that C.C. described in detail
inappropriate touching by her father.9
Colburn intended to defend the charges involving his daughter,
C.C., by attacking the interview techniques used by Hansen.10 The court
excluded Colburn’s expert, Dr. Donna Zook, as unqualified.11 She

1

State v. Colburn, 366 P.3d 258 (Mont. 2016).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–5–511(2) (2015).
3
Colburn, 366 P.3d at 260.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 264–65 (McKinnon, J., concurring). Justice McKinnon provides detail about C.C.’s trial
testimony, noting that C.C. testified that Colburn touched her inappropriately, including reaching
underneath her nightgown. Id. Surprisingly, the majority opinion opines that C.C. “denied generally
that Colburn had done anything wrong to her.” Id. at 260 (majority opinion).
6
Id.
7
Colburn, 366 P.3d at 261
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
2
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intended to opine that Hansen used leading questions in her interview of
C.C.12
Colburn intended to defend the charges involving R.W. by
proving that the allegations were fabricated and that R.W. had an
alternative source of sexual knowledge.13 Colburn’s theory was that R.W.
fabricated the allegations against Colburn to test if her mother would
believe her, and when her mother took the allegations seriously, R.W. felt
safe in disclosing that her father had molested her.14 Colburn argued that
R.W. gained the sexual knowledge disclosed in the Hansen interview from
her father and not him.15 One month after disclosing Colburn’s abuse,
R.W. disclosed the sexual abuse by her father, noting she only felt
comfortable doing so because the allegations against Colburn were taken
seriously.16 R.W.’s father was charged with incest and plead guilty to
sexual assault.17
Montana’s rape shield law provides:
Evidence concerning the sexual conduct of the victim is
inadmissible in prosecutions under this part except evidence of the
victim’s past sexual conduct with the offender or evidence of
specific instances of the victim’s sexual activity to show the origin
of semen, pregnancy, or disease that is at issue in the
prosecution.18
The district court determined that R.W.’s prior molestation was
inadmissible under this statute.19
Colburn appealed, challenging the exclusion of Dr. Zook’s
testimony and the exclusion of R.W.’s prior molestation, arguing the
application of the rape shield law violated his constitutional right to
present a defense.20
III. MAJORITY HOLDING
In a short opinion authored by Chief Justice Mike McGrath, the
majority held for Colburn on both issues and remanded the case for a new
trial.21 First, the Court determined the district court abused its discretion
in excluding Zook’s testmony.22
12

Id.
Colburn, 366 P.3d at 262.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 265 (McKinnon, J., concurring).
17
Id.
18
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–5–511(2).
19
Colburn, 366 P.3d at 262.
20
Id. at 265.
21
Id. at 264.
22
Id. at 262.
13
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Second, the majority held that the district court improperly applied
the rape shield law without considering Colburn’s right to present a
defense.23 The majority started by discussing the public policy of the rape
shield law; that it is intended to prevent trying the victim, as the victim’s
prior sexual history is generally irrelevant to issues of consent or the
victims truthfulness.24 Montana’s rape shield law extends to children, and
the policy is similar: to protect children from having to defend past abuses
and minimizing the trauma of testifying.25
The majority opined that conflicts can arise between rape shield
statues and a defendant’s rights to confrontation and a defense.26 The Court
held that a trial court must strike a balance between the defendant’s and
victim’s rights, as neither are absolute.27 Citing past cases, it held the rape
shield law could not mechanistically or arbitrarily exclude evidence.28 The
majority provided guidance to trial courts, stating that they should consider
whether the evidence is relevant and probative, whether the evidence is
merely cumulative of the other admissible evidence, and whether the
probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.29
The Court specified that a defendant’s evidence cannot be merely
speculative or unsupported.30 It notes the purpose of this analysis is to
provide a fair trial for the defendant while, at the same time, upholding the
compelling state interest of protecting victims.31
The Court ultimately held that the district court abused its
discretion when it mechanistically applied the rape shield law instead of
weighing the interests of the defendant and victim.32 Notably, while the
Court required the balancing, it did not expressly hold that the trial court
must admit evidence of R.W.’s prior molestation at the second trial.
IV. JUSTICE MCKINNON’S CONCURRENCE
Justice McKinnon ultimately agreed with the outcome but wrote
separately to provide guidance on how to apply the rape shield law in
23

Id. at 264.
Id. at 261–61 (citing State v. Higley, 621 P.2d 1043, 1050–1051 (Mont. 1980); Michigan v. Lucas,
500 U.S. 145, 146 (1991); State v. Anderson, 686 P.2d 193, 199 (Mont. 1984); Tanya Bagne Marcketti,
Rape shield laws: DO They Shield the Children, 78 IOWA L. REV. 754–55 (1993)).
25
Colburn, 366 P.3d at 261–261 (citing Sec. 3, Ch. 172, Mont. L. 1985.; Marcketti, supra note 24, at
754–55).
26
Id. at 263.
27
Id. at 262 (citing State v. MacKinnon, 957 P.2d 23, 30 (Mont. 1998); State v. Johnson, 958 P.2d
1182, 1186 (Mont. 1998)).
28
Id. at 263 (citing Johnson, 958 P.2d at 1186).
29
Id. at 263 (citing Mont. R. Evid. 401, 402, 403 and 404; Commonwealth v. Fernsler, 715 A.2d 435,
440 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1998); Anderson, 686 P.2d at 199).
30
Id. at 263 (citing Johnson, 958 P.2d at 1186; State v. Lindberg, 196 P.3d 1252, 1264–65 (Mont.
2008)).
31
Colburn, 366 P.3d at 262 (citing Anderson, 686 P.2d at 199).
32
Id. at 264. Interestingly, despite holding the district court abused its discretion in its application of
the rape shield law, the standard of review the court sets forth for application of a statute is correctness.
Colburn, 366 P.3d at 260.
24
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practice.33 McKinnon noted additional factual details supplementing the
brief majority opinion.34 She also argued that because this was an
evidentiary and constitutional matter, the proper standard of review was
de novo.35
Justice McKinnon adopted the same balancing test as the majority
for her analysis36 and recognized that the Court made exceptions to the
rape shield law in the past.37 She suggested a two-step analysis, where a
district court first identifies the permissible basis for admission and then
balances the probative value of the evidence against the interest in
protecting the integrity of the trial.38 She argued there is no blanket
exception to the rape shield law for motive to fabricate and alternative
source of sexual knowledge.39 Justice McKinnon argued that Colburn’s
constitutional rights were violated when he was denied the right to explore
the witness’s motives to fabricate and alternative source of knowledge.40
She concluded that the district court improperly applied the rape shield
law when it failed to balance Colburn’s rights against the interests of the
rape shield law.41
V. ANALYSIS
Criminal defendants have a right to present a meaningful defense
under various provisions of both the Montana and Federal Constitution.42
The exclusion of Zook’s testimony contributed to the denial of Colburn’s
ability to present a defense. The second issue, regarding the application of
Montana’s rape shield law, will have long-lasting effects on Montana
jurisprudence. The majority holding, that the Montana Constitution
requires a balancing test when applying the rape shield law, was wrongly
decided under the Montana Constitution.
Montana Courts have upheld the constitutionality of the rape
shield law under the Federal Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and
Montana article II, section 17 and 24, which provide rights for the

33

Id. at 264 (McKinnon, J., concurring).
Id. at 264–65.
Id. at 265 (citing State v. Patterson, 291 P.3d 556, 558–559 (Mont. 2012); State v. Stock, 256 P.3d
899, 902 (Mont. 2011); State v. Derbyshire, 201 P.3d 811, 816–17 (Mont. 2009)).
36
Id. at 266–67 (citing Lindberg, 196 P.3d at 1264–1265; Lajoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 (9th
Cir. 2000)).
37
Colburn, 366 P.3d at 267 (citing Johnson, 958 P.2d at 1186; Anderson, 686 P.2d at 199) (victim’s
prior sexual assault allegations were admissible because they were proven untrue).
38
Id. at 267.
39
Id. at 267–68.
40
Id. at 268.
41
Id. at 269.
42
State v. Jay, 298 P.3d 396, 404 (Mont. 2013) (citations omitted); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,
690 (1986) (citations omitted). This right stems from due process, compulsory process and the
confrontation clause, though I will refer to these rights generally as the confrontation right as it is most
relevant to Colburn.
34
35
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accused.43 Unfortunately, the Montana Supreme Court has never clearly
articulated the standard of scrutiny applied to the confrontation clause and
has never decided if the Montana confrontation clause provides more
protection than the Federal confrontation clause.
This provides little guidance to prosecutors and criminal
defendants under the Court’s balancing approach. Justice McKinnon
recognized this lack of guidance; however, she conducted her analysis
under the same incorrect balancing approach.
A. The Standard of Scrutiny
In past confrontation clause challenges to the Montana rape shield
law, the Montana Supreme Court quoted the U.S. Supreme Court: “[t]he
Sixth Amendment is not absolute, and may bow to accommodate other
legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.”44 The U.S. Supreme
Court has also opined that lawmakers have broad latitude under the
Constitution to institute rules precluding evidence from criminal trials.45
The Montana Supreme Court, through the adoption of this Federal
language, seemed to hold that the confrontation right required only a
legitimate state interest to infringe, implying the use of a lower standard
of scrutiny. Yet, the Montana Supreme Court went on to justify the rape
shield law with what it described as a “compelling state interest,” implying
a heightened standard of scrutiny.46 The Montana Supreme Court also
relies on the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Chambers v. Mississippi,47
where “rules may not be mechanistically applied to defeat the ends of
justice.” The Montana Supreme Court is not clear on the proper standard
of scrutiny to apply to the rape shield law under the confrontation clause.
Further, it is unclear whether the Montana Constitution provides an
expanded confrontation right to criminal defendants. Because the Montana
Constitution could provide more protection for the accused, the
Constitutional analysis in this article is conducted under the Montana
Constitution.
The Montana Supreme Court has held that it is not bound by the
U.S. Supreme Court when developing the confrontation clause
jurisprudence, as the Montana Constitution may guarantee greater rights
than the Federal constitution.48 Yet, the Montana Supreme Court has also
acknowledged it has not yet afforded a greater confrontation right than the
Federal constitution.49 Under the Montana Constitution, Article II rights,

43

State v. Howell, 839 P.2d 87, 91 (Mont. 1992); State v. Steffes, 887 P.2d 1196, 1206 (Mont. 1994).
Id. at 91 (Mont. 1992) (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)).
45
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998).
46
Howell, 839 P.2d at 91 (Mont. 1992) (citing State v. Van Pelt, 805 P.2d 549 (Mont. 1991).
47
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
48
State v. Clark, 964 P.2d 766, 771 (Mont. 1998).
49
City of Missoula v. Duane, 355 P.3d 729, 732–33 (Mont. 2015) (citations omitted).
44
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including confrontation rights of an accused, are fundamental rights.50 In
Montana, laws which infringe upon a fundamental right employ strict
scrutiny.51 Thus, the proper standard of scrutiny for the confrontation
clause under the Montana Constitution is strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny
requires both a compelling government interest and a showing by the
government that the law is narrowly tailored to serve that compelling
interest.52 Further, due to this heightened standard of scrutiny, the Montana
Constitution provides more protection for the rights of the accused than
the Federal Constitution.
Here, Colburn presents an as-applied challenge to Montana’s rape
shield law. Given that he was essentially denied his only defense to the
allegations involving R.W., his confrontation right was infringed by the
application of the rape shield law. Therefore, we analyze the application
of the rape shield law to Colburn under strict scrutiny, by asking if the law
is narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.
B. The Compelling Government Interest
The Montana Supreme Court held that the rape shield law served
a compelling state interest in preventing a trial of a rape victim.53 While
this is certainly a compelling interest, the rape shield law serves a myriad
of other public policy purposes. Consider the advisory comment to the
Federal rape shield law:
[T]he rule aims to safeguard the alleged victim against the
invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual
stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of intimate
sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into the
factfinding process. By affording victims protection in most
instances, the rule also encourages victims of sexual misconduct
to institute and to participate in legal proceedings against alleged
offenders.54
There is a clear interest in protecting victims. National studies estimate 18
percent of women are raped at some time in their lives and 63 percent of
sexual crimes go unreported.55 There is a clear, compelling state interest
in protecting alleged victims and encouraging victims to report assaults—

50

Clark, 964 P.2d at 771 (citations omitted).
In re S.L.M., 951 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Mont. 1997).
52
Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State, 286 P.3d 1161, 1165 (Mont. 2012).
53
Howell, 839 P.2d at 91 (Mont. 1992) (citing Van Pelt, 805 P.2d at 549).
54
Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory comm. n. 1.
55
National Sexual Violence Resource Center, Statistics About Sexual Violence, NSVRC.org,
https://perma.cc/5PCQ–LSFG (Last visited April 20, 2016).
51
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this is especially true for child sexual abuse, where 88 percent of cases go
unreported.56
C. The Narrowly-Tailored Law
Instead of asking whether Montana’s rape shield law is narrowly
tailored, the Colburn court instead held that a trial court must strike a
balance between the defendant and victim’s rights.57 This type of interest
balancing, however, is not part of strict scrutiny.58 Strict scrutiny is a
balancing test, but only because it balances opposing claims.59 The
balancing is built in, as only compelling governmental interests with a
narrowly tailored law can outweigh an individual right.60 Interjecting an
additional balancing element dilutes the scrutiny and gives courts broad
discretion to strike down laws.61 In this case, this balancing test makes the
rape shield law meaningless, as balancing essentially reverts the analysis
to the normal evidentiary relevance analysis.
The question the Court should address, instead of the balancing
question, is whether the rape shield law is narrowly tailored to protecting
victims of sexual violence, as-applied to Colburn’s situation. For a law to
be narrowly tailored, it must advance the interest, must not be under- or
over-inclusive, and there must not be a less restrictive alternative.62
As applied to Colburn, the rape shield law excluded evidence that
R.W. was molested in a prior incident by someone other than Colburn.
First, the application advances the state interest of protecting a child from
being traumatized during a cross examination where she is forced to
discuss a prior molestation. This protection also serves to promote
reporting and prosecuting sexual crimes. Even in the case of child victims,
the rape shield protections make guardians, counselors, and prosecutors
less hesitant to bring a case forward. Thus, in Colburn’s case, the
compelling state interest is advanced by the application of the rape shield
statute.
The law is not under- or over-inclusive and there is no less
restrictive alternative. Under Montana’s rape shield law, all sexual conduct
of the victim is excluded, with the narrow exceptions for sexual conduct
between the victim and defendant as well as evidence showing the origin
of semen, pregnancy, or disease. Allowing any additional evidence of the

56

Id.
Colburn, 366 P.3d at 262 (majority opinion) (citing State v. MacKinnon, 957 P.2d 23, 30 (Mont.
1998); State v. Johnson, 958 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Mont. 1998)). This balancing test is used in the Federal
courts. See Lajoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 (9th Cir. 2000)).
58
Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1265 (2011).
59
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2438–40 (1996).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 2422 (collecting cases).
57
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victim’s sexual conduct would fail to protect victims and subject them to
a harassing cross examination. In Colburn’s case, there is no way to allow
cross examination about prior sexual abuse without violating the
protection provided to the victim. Thus, the application to Colburn is
narrowly tailored to the compelling state interest.
Given this, even under strict scrutiny, the application of the rape
shield law to exclude evidence of R.W.’s prior abuse does not violate
Colburn’s rights because the law is narrowly tailored to a compelling state
interest.
D. The Future of Montana’s Rape Shield Statute
The majority likely applied the improper balancing test instead of
true strict scrutiny because it seemed unfair that Colburn was essentially
denied his entire defense. Whether this is an equitable outcome or not, the
Court’s job is to determine whether the statute violates an individual’s
right, not whether the statute is fair. The fairness question is one for the
legislature.
The Federal rape shield law may be a good model for legislators
pondering the future of Montana’s rape shield statute. Montana’s rape
shield law precludes evidence of all “sexual conduct” of a victim in
prosecutions of sexual crimes and provides two exceptions: sexual
conduct between the victim and offender or evidence to show the “origin
of semen, pregnancy, or disease.”63 The Federal rape shield law64
precludes a victim’s sexual behavior or sexual predisposition in both
criminal and civil matters alleging sexual misconduct and provides three
exceptions.65 The first two exceptions are similar to Montana’s; however,
the third exception is for “evidence whose exclusion would violate the
defendant’s constitutional rights.”66 The comments note the protections
extend to the victim “except in designated circumstances in which the
probative value of the evidence significantly outweighs possible harm to
the victim.”67 The comments further elaborate on this:
[E]vidence of specific instances of conduct may not be excluded
if the result would be to deny a criminal defendant the protections
afforded by the Constitution. For example, statements in which
the victim has expressed an intent to have sex with the first person
encountered on a particular occasion might not be excluded
without violating the due process right of a rape defendant seeking

63

MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–5–511(2).
Fed. R. Evid. 412. The Federal rape shield law is in the Federal rules of evidence in the article on
relevance; the Montana rape shield law is in the criminal code.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory comm. n. 2 (emphasis added).
64
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to prove consent . . . in various circumstances a defendant may
have a right to introduce evidence otherwise precluded by an
evidence rule under the Confrontation Clause.68
Under the Federal rape shield law, there are instances where a
confrontation right may allow evidence otherwise excluded by the law,
such as in Colburn’s case. Along with these expanded rights for
defendants, the Federal law provides broader protection for victims as
well, extending the protection to civil trials and a range of topics broader
than just “sexual conduct of the victim.”69
VI. CONCLUSION
Several decades of Montana case law has failed to clearly
articulate the confrontation protection provided by the Montana
Constitution. This has led the Court to apply an improper balancing test.
Because the confrontation right is a fundamental right, the proper test is
strict scrutiny. Under this test, the exclusions of Colburn’s proffered
evidence was proper because Montana’s rape shield law is narrowly
tailored to a compelling state interest.

68

Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory comm. n. 17.
Montana Courts have held that “sexual conduct of the victim” includes child sexual abuse. Howell,
839 P.2d at 92 (citations omitted).
69

